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C ONDUCT

BETWEEN PARENT and child may affect property
or persons in situations similar to those between husband and wife*
and also present questions of whether causes of action in tort arise
and whether remedies that otherwise would be available for tort are
available to one against the other.**
Some factors would seem to make the problem here simpler;
others, however, more complex.
I.

At common law no tort action could be brought by one spouse
against the other spouse. Various reasons have been given for this
result, but the principal immediate reasons were the incapacity of a
married woman to sue or be sued generally without joinder of her
husband as party plaintiff or defendant and the further inability of
spouses to sue, or even to have certain rights against, each other, consequent upon the concept of legal unity of husband and wife.' The
question of whether possible civil causes of action for tort would lie
between spouses which seems to have been first raised after divorce
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
*See McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During Marriage
of the Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VILL. L. REv. 447 (1957) ;
McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. Riv. 303
(1959).
** For an earlier discussion see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relationship, 43 HARv. L. Rev. 1030, 1056 (1930).
1. Under the doctrine of the separate estate in equity which developed in the
eighteen century a wife could maintain proceedings in equity in matters concerning
her equitable separate estate. See 2 VILL. L. REv. 448-452 (1957) ; 4 VILL. L. REv.
304-305 (1959).
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had been provided for by general law and the parties divorced, was
decided in the negative.2 It was again raised after enactment of
Married Women's Statutes, and the answer thereafter has been considered to depend upon construction of those statutes. Since few
Married Women's Statutes contain express provisions one way or the
other in the matter, statutory construction has involved, in reality,
application of public policies: whether the statute is to be regarded as
in derogation of the common law and strictly construed or whether it
is to be considered remedial and liberally construed; whether the
general policy that every person should be secure in his person and in
his property and should have a remedy for wrongful invasion of such
interests should control; or whether such general policy should be
qualified by a special policy to safeguard peace and harmony within the
family and not encourage discord and disruption of domestic tranquillity. Since at least one purpose of these statutes is protection of
the married woman in her property, even against her husband, interspousal property actions in general can be maintained (although in a
few states the proceeding must be in equity) ;' but by the weight of
authority there is no cause of action by one spouse against the other
in tort for personal injuries; however, there is substantial minority
authority recognizing such a cause of action, provided the act complained of is in substance tortious and not qualified by accepted
standards of marital and family conduct. 4
The relations of husband and wife and of parent and child are
dissimilar in many respects, not only factually but also in legal effect.
The marital relation is entered into by consent but is thereafter controlled by law. It can be dissolved only by death (either party predeceasing the other) or where provided by law, by divorce (a comparatively late development in Anglo-American law). Its purpose is a
relationship for joint lives sanctioned by society by law for companionship and mutual assistance, control of concupiscence, and the orderly
and lawful establishment of family and the procreation of children.
Apart from these basic things incidents of the relationship may vary
from society to society and from time to time. The parent-child relationship is usually based upon blood (but may be based on adoption), 5
and is therefore not normally entered into by mutual assent, but in
either case once created it too is controlled by law. Blood relationship
2. Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877) ; Phillips v. Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
3. See 2 VILL. L. REv. 447 (1957). A contrary construction of the statutes
would be more restrictive than the equitable separate estate doctrine they were
designed to extend.
4. See 4 VILL. L. Rrv. 303 (1959).
5. Adoption was unknown to the common law. See infra note 169.
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is permanent in time, but in Anglo-American law (unlike in the Roman
law), with the exception of matters of inheritance, consanguinous or
affinity marriage, incest, and possibly statutory duties of support
in extreme situations, little if any legal significance attaches to the relation of parent and child after the child has reached majority. The
purpose of the relation (factual as well as legally recognized) is to rear
the minor child. To this end the parent has during minority the custody
of and the right to control and discipline the child and the duty to
support and properly care for him.'
The concept of legal identity or unity of husband and wife is not
applicable to parent and child. Moreover at common law a parent
(unlike a husband in the case of his wife) acquires no right to or in
(even a right to use) property of any kind of his minor child, 7 although
he can be guardian for the property, and under statutes may have a
preferential but not absolute right to be appointed such.8 A minor,
unlike a married woman, has at least capacity to make voidable contracts, 9 transfers, and conveyances,' 0 unless under property guardianship." The parent has no indirect liability to others for the child's
tortious conduct 12 as did the husband in the case of his wife;3 and,
also unlike husband and wife, the proceeds of a minor's own cause of
action for tortious injury by others are his and not his parent's to
appropriate."4 A minor does not lack capacity to sue or be sued as did
the married woman. True, suit is brought in his behalf by a next friend,
and if sued, he is represented by a guardian ad litem, but only in representative capacities. The parent usually acts in these roles, but not
if interests are adverse.' 5 There are therefore no difficulties of legal
identity or of procedure to preclude a civil action by a minor child
against his parent. No statutes have been found dealing expressly with
6. See MCCURDY, CASES ON DoMESTIc RELATIONs 791-807, 840-843, 862-888
(4th ed. 1952).
7. Pollard v. Pollard, 207 Ala. 270-272, 92 So. 488 (1922). Under certain circumstances a parent might apply the child's property toward the child's support. Linton
v. Walker, 8 Fla. 144 (1858).
8. Estate of Tetsubumi Yano, 188 Cal. 645, 206 Pac. 995 (1922).
9. Edmunds v. Mister, 58 Miss. 765 (1881) ; Holt v. Ward Clarencieux, 93
Eng. Rep. 954, 2 Str. 937 (K.B. 1732).
10. Hubbard v. Cummings, 1 Greenl. 11 (Me. 1820) ; Zouch v. Parsons, 96
Eng. Rep. 332, 3 Burr. 1794 (K.B. 1765).
11. Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Met. 559 (Mass. 1847); Stafford v. Roof, 9 Cow.
626 (N.Y. 1827).
12. Charbonneau v. Mac Rury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 Atl. 457 (1931); Briese v.
Maechtle, 146 Wis. 89, 130 N.W. 893 (1911) ; Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 230
(1863) ; Scott v. Watson, 46 Me. 362 (1859).
13. Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119 (1868).
14. Wilton v. Middlesex R.R., 125 Mass. 130 (1878) ; Donahoe v. Richards, 33
Me. 376 (1854).
15. McCURDY, CASES ON DoMESTIc RELATIONS 836-840 (4th ed. 1952).
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the matter, and no statutes similar to Married Women's Acts to
"construe."
Other incidents, however, require mention, particularly in reference to the matter of personal injuries. At common law a husband was
entitled to his wife's services of whatever character and to her earnings
for services for whomsoever performed,16 and was under a duty to
support. 1 7 For tortious injury (even though permanent) to a married
woman's person that affected her services or earnings, or resulted in
medical expenses or the like the action to recover damages was the
husband's own,'" the possibility that she might survive him being disregarded. Dower served at a time when wealth was largely in land as
a means of support for a widow. After divorce was provided for by
general law awards in lieu of destroyed dower 9 were made possible2"
and alimony, in practice if not in theory, could take into account a
divorced wife's needs resulting from personal injury.2' Consequently,
even if she could be said to have a cause of action for personal injuries
inflicted upon her by her husband there would be either no primary
elements of damages or else little that would be pressing for monetary
redress, except for the possibility of dissipation of assets before termination of coverture 2 Married Women's Statutes have not affected the
husband's duty to support 23 but they have affected his right to services
and earnings.24 In many states a married woman has a right to her
16. Clapp v. Stoughton, 10 Pick. 463, 469 (Mass. 1830).
17. Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 47 Atl. 80 (1899); Woodward v. Barnes, 43
Vt. 330 (1871).
18. Hooper v. Haskell, 56 Me. 251 (1868); Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156
(1866); Dengate v. Gardner, 4 M. & W. 5 (Ex. 1838). Pain and suffering and
mental anguish were elements recoverable in the wife's action, which if brought
during coverture was brought in the name of the husband and wife and if reduced
to judgment during coverture the damages recovered belonged to the husband just
as a wife's chose in action reduced to possession. Otherwise it remained the wife's.
19. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
20. Price v. Price, 124 N.Y. 589, 27 N.E. 383 (1891). See also Seuss v. Schukat,
358 Ill. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934) ; 3 VA. L. Rtv. 58 (1922).
21. See Kennard v. Kennard, 87 N.H. 320, 179 Atd. 414 (1935); Phillips v.
Barnet, 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876).
22. Dower in its common-law sense has been widely abolished, the surviving
wife (sometimes either spouse) instead being made a "statutory heir" and furthermore in many states is protected from disinheritance under her husband's will or by
certain prejudicial transfers within a certain period of time preceding his death. See
infra note 33.
23. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945) ; French v. McAnarney,
290 Mass. 545, 195 N.E. 714 (1935) ; Kosanke v. Kosanke, 137 Minn. 115, 162 N.W.
1060 (1917); DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 96 N.E. 722 (1911);
Fitzmaurice v. Buck, 77 Conn. 390, 59 Atl. 416 (1904) ; Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H.
231, 47 At]. 80 (1899).
24. Robert v. Haines, 112 Ga. 842, 38 S.E. 109 (1901); Brackett's Estate v.
Burnham's Estate, 207 Mich. 361, 174 N.W. 121 (1919); Blaechinska v. Howard
Mission, 130 N.Y. 497, 29 N.E. 755 (1892) ; Nuding v. Urich, 169 Pa. 289, 32 Atl.
409 (1895).
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earnings even when she is employed without her husband's consent;5
but the husband is notwithstanding still considered to be entitled to
"usual" domestic services.26 Consequently the wife recovers from a
third person in her own action in her own name for impairment of her
earning capacity, and the husband recovers in his action for loss of
services to wh,ch he is still entitled and for expenses of increased
support.27 In very few states is the entire action now the married
woman's own for either or both elements.2" And so, in an action by a
wife against her husband, if sanctioned, the item of impairment of
earning capacity would, at least to some extent, be a proper element of
damages, and although the items of expense would still be referable to
the husband's duty of support since the wife may have voluntarily paid
or incurred them, they might or might not be recoverable in such action.
A parent is entitled to the services and earnings of his minor child
but for a different reason, the correct view, it would seem, being that
this is an attribute of custody and discipline, the amounts usually being
so small that the parent is entitled to them as his own.2 9 In an action
by a parent against another for tortious injury to the person of the
child he can recover damages for loss of services and earnings,3° and
for increased items of support during minority only."' Permanent injury or injury impairing earning capacity beyond minority is an item
of damages recoverable in the child's own action. 2 Consequently in an
action (if it is to be sanctioned) by a minor child against his parent
for a tortious injury to his person the child's recovery should be limited
to elements of damages that extend beyond the period of minority.
There is, of course, the possibility that a sole surviving parent may
predecease the child and die testate making no provision for the
25. Harmon v. Old Colony R.R., 165 Mass. 100, 42 N.E. 505 (1896).
26. Kleinert v. Hutchinson, 98 N.J.L. 831, 121 Atl. 743 (1923); Bechtol v.
Ewing, 89 Ohio St. 53, 105 N.E. 72 (1913).
27. Mewhirter v. Hatten, 42 Iowa 288 (1875); Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry.,
78 N.H. 289, 99 Atil. 298 (1916); Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196 S.C. 230,

13 S.E.2d 1 (1941).
28. Gaillard v. Boynton, 70 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1934); Rodgers v. Boynton, 315
Mass. 279, 52 N.E.2d 576 (1943); Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N.E.

169 (1929).
29. Hammond .v. Corbett, 50 N.H. 501 (1872). Statutes in some states protect
an employer who pays wages to a minor child before he knows that the parent is
claiming them. See VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 232. See also CAL. CIV.
CoDE § 36 (Deering, 1949), dealing with dramatic or professional athletic services
of a minor, and empowering court to approve such contracts and to require a portion
up to one-half of net earnings to be set aside in trust for the child.
30. Wilton v. Middlesex R. Co., 125 Mass. 130 (1878).
31. Netherland-American Steam Nay. v. Hollander, 59 Fed. 417 (2d Cir. 1894).
32. Dennis v. Clark, 2 Cush. 347 (Mass. 1848). See fdrther MCCURDY, CASES
ON !)OMESTiC RELAT!ONS 981, 982 (4th ed. 1952).
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orphaned child. That, however, is a problem that should be dealt with
in other ways.33

Hence, properly limited, there seems more reason for sanctioning
causes of action by a irinor child against his parent than there is in the
case of husband and wife, if the parent's conduct violates accepted
standards of family conduct or exceeds the bounds of permissible parental control and discipline and would be tortious on general principles.
It is the policy of the law that a minor child should be reared and
properly cared for and should reach majority and start adult life unencumbered by contractual obligations except those properly incurred
for necessaries," unimpaired in person, and with his property having
been properly handled, or else possess a money equivalent for wrongful
impairment. It is universally conceded that for certain kinds of improper or wrongful conduct custody of the child may be taken from
the parent and placed in another and that the parent is amenable to the
criminal law. It is consistent with this policy that the parent should
be legally compelled to repair by way of damages wrongful injuries
to the child's person (as well as his property) the effects of which
extend beyond minority, and that the child should have a civil action
against the parent, rather than to leave the matter to the possible
33. A child, even a minor child, unlike a spouse, has generally no legal safeguard (even though orphaned) against disinheritance or prejudicial transfers by
his parent. See Robinson v. Robinson, 131 W. Va. 160, 50 S.E.2d 455 (1948) (1 ALA.
L. REv. 296; 62 HARV. L. REv. 1079; 97 U. PA. L. REv. 736; 35 VA. L. Rzv. 482) ;
Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (25 MICH. L. Rev.
555; 2 VA. L. REv. (n.s.) 702; 36 YALE L.J. 424). See also, 53 HARV. L. REv.
469-472 (1940).
In England, by statute (1 & 2 Geo. VI, ch. 45) enacted in 1938, applicable
to persons dying testate and as amended by 15 & 16 Geo. VI and 1 Eliz. II, ch.
64 § 7, and schedule 3, extending it to intestacy, where a decedent leaving wife or
husband; a daughter who has not been married or is mentally or physikally disabled and incapable of self-maintenance; an infant son; or a son who is mentally or
physically disabled and incapable of self-maintenance -the
court may on application by such "dependent," if the court having in mind other provisions that had
been made is of the opinion that the disposition of the decedent's estate is not such
as to make a reasonable provision for the maintenance of that dependent order that
such reasonable provision and on such terms that the court sees fit be made of the
decedent's net estate for the maintenance of that dependent; but no such application
may be made where the disposition of the estate is such that the surviving spouse is
entitled to not less than two-thirds of the income of the net estate and when the
only other dependent or dependents is a child or children of the surviving spouse.
There are also provisions for termination of the order on the happening of certain
events. The statute does not preclude possible dissipation of assets before death.
Other parts of the British Commonwealth and components have similar legislation. See
note, Provisions for Dependents: The English Inheritance Act of 1938, 53 HARV. L.
REv. 465-469 (1940). See also Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testation, 69 HARV.
L. Rev. 277, 287 (1955).
34. See R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Sheill, [1914] 3 K.B. 607 (C.A.). An infant is liable
for necessaries only if his parent is unable to supply them or is in default in his
duty. Cole v. Wagner, 197 N.C. 692, 150 S.E. 339 (1929); Bainbridge v. Pickering,
2 Wm. BI. 1325 (K.B. 1779).
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bounty of the parent or others which may be affected by caprice or by
changed circumstances or attitudes.3 5
Nevertheless, although property tort actions between parent and
minor child have always been maintainable,3 6 fewer jurisdictions
sanction tort actions for personal injuries than in the case of husband
and wife.

II.
Although many cases sanctioned ordinary property actions between
parent and minor child and similarly contract actions 37 no case has
been found prior to 1891, either in England or in the United States,
which even presented the question of a civil cause of action in tort for
personal injuries. There were, however, cases that sanctioned such
action against one in loco parentis, on the premise that a parent would
be liable in a similar situation. These cases usually involved intentional
wilful injuries (excessive chastisement), although there is one case
holding liability in tort for negligence in not properly clothing a minor
child. As to actions against a parent text-writers, in the absence of
direct authority, were in some conflict.3"
In 1891 in Hezwellette v. George39 it was held, reversing a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff after trial and without citation of authority of
any kind, that a minor daughter, who was married but separated from
her husband and living with her mother, could not maintain an action
against the estate of her deceased mother for a personal injury, for
the reasons that such action would disturb domestic harmony and interfere with parental control. This case was followed in 1903 by McKelvey
v. McKelvey," an action against a father and a step-mother, which had
been dismissed on demurrer, that again denied such cause of action as
a well-settled-rule, citing Hewellette v. George and husband-wife cases.
And this result was reached again in 1905 in Roller v. Roller41 where
35. Supra note 33.
36. See Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954) ; Blades v. So.
Farmers Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 95 So.2d 209 (La. App. 1957) ; London Guarantee &
Accident Co. v. Smith, 242 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954); Wells v. Wells, 48
S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932) ; In Re Flasch, 51 N.J. Super. 1, 148 A.2d 208 (1958) ;
Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ati. 905 (1930) ; Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore.
282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) ; Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939) ; Borst
v. Borst, 41 Wash. 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17,
166 S.E. 538 (1932). See also Darlington v. Basalt Rock Co., 321 P.2d 490 (Cal.
App. 1959) ; Stitzinger v. Stitzinger Lumber Co., 187 Pa. Super. 453, 144 A.2d
486 (1958). See further Becker v. Rieck, 188 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1959) ; 43 HARV. L.
REv. 1057 (1930).
37. 43 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1930).
38. 43 HARV. L. REV. 1059-1063 (1930).
39. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
40. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
41. 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
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a demurrer to a complaint had been overruled and judgment given for
the plaintiff after trial.
These three cases were all extreme ones on their facts. The
Hc7('ellctte case involved alleged malicious incarceration in an insane
asylum for a period of ten days; the McKelvey case was an action
involving alleged cruel and inhuman treatment; in the Roller case it
appeared that the father had been convicted of rape of his minor
daughter and had been sentenced to prison, for which wrong the action
was brought for damages. In the McKelvey and Roller cases additional
policy reasons were invoked.
These cases were subsequently followed in other jurisdictions
whether the conduct involved was wilful42 or negligent,4" and whether
the action was brought after majority or before."' As late as 1930
there were few cases indeed that had held the other way. Some cases
held that an action could be maintained for assault and battery where
the defendant was not a parent but was in loco parentis.4 5 One Canadian
case, relying in part onl a general right-wrong statute, held that an
action could be brought by a minor child against the parent for injuries
sustained as a result of the parent's negligent operation of a motor
vehicle. 46 And in Taubert v. Taubert47 it was held that an emancipated
minor child could maintain an action for injury resulting from negligence while working in the parent's factory. Some jurisdictions that
had held that a wife could maintain a personal injury tort action against
her husband nevertheless held that a minor child could not maintain
such an action against the parent.4 8
An examination of the opinions in the cases discloses that at least
seven reasons, apart from the assumption that absence of case authority
42. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924) ; Miller v. Pelzer,
159 Minn. 375, 199 N.W. 97 (1924).
43. Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Ati. 753 (1929) ; Small v. Morrison,
185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) ; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Att. 198
(1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927) ; Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 222 App. Div. 835, 225 N.Y. Supp. 907, aff'd without opinion, 248 N.Y. 626,
162 N.E. 551 (1928) (two judges dissenting without opinion). See also, 43 HARV.
L. Rev. 1067 (1930) referring to other lower court cases from Michigan, New
Jersey and New York.
44. Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924).
45. Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Dix v.
Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95
N.W. 640 (1903). And see, Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 577 (1895).
46. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Marchand, [1924] 4 D.L.R. 157.
47. 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908).
48. Contrast Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566, 118 S.E. 9 (1923) and Crowell
v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920), 181 N.C. 66, 106 S.E. 149 (1921)
with Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923) (opinion filed on the
same day as the Roberts case) ; and Waite v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 210 N.W. 822
(1926)

with Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927) ; Brown v. Brown,

88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914) and Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Ati.
432 (1925) with Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Att. 753 (1929).
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prior to 1891 established that no such action existed at common law,
have been given for denial of a personal injury action between parent
and minor child: the position of the family as a quasi-governing unit;
the husband-wife cases denying an action despite a married women's
statute; danger of fraud (stale claims asserted after majority) ; possibility of succession (inheritance of amount recovered in damages);
family exchequer (financial detriment to other children) ; disturbance
of domestic tranquillity (although a reason sometimes suggested of
the danger of possible domestic collusion where there is liability insurance is antithetical) ; and interference with parental discipline and control. It is to be noted that only the last reason is applicable exclusively
to the parent-child relation, and that not all are applicable to actions
by a parent against his minor child. The two principal reasons relied
upon have been the danger of disturbing domestic harmony and encouraging discord, and interference with parental discipline and control.
The other reasons have tended to be lightly stressed or disregarded
altogether as being either obsolete or inconsequential; some have been
said to be unsound.4 0
III.
In 1930 in Dunlap v. Dunlap,"° the New Hampshire court, after
referring to Hewellette v. George5 as "[w]hat this case really did was
to establish a new rule of exceptional character rather than enforce a
rule already established," and after an elaborate exploration of all
aspects of the problem of inter-parent-child tort actions, and an extensive review of all the cases decided to that time, expressed its conclusion
thus: "It is conceded, of course, that parental authority should be
maintained. To this end it is also conceded that the parent should not
ordinarily be accountable to the child for a failure to perform a parental
duty, and that vindication of personal rights should not be conceded
to the child if it would impair the discharge of such duties. . . .For
mistaken judgment as to the extent of chastisement, or for negligent
disrepair of the home the father provides, there is usually no liability.
These acts all grow out of and pertain to the relation of parent and
child. The relation gives rise to the duty alleged to have been violated."
But as to true torts, "[t]here is much to be said in support of the contention that the whole theory of nonliability effected through a rule of
49.
50.
135; 15
51.

43 HARV. L. Rev. 1030,
84 N.H. 352, 150 Atd.
MINN. L. REv. 126; 3
68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885

1072-1077 (1930).
905 (1930) (10 B.U.L. Rev. 584; 44 HARV. L. Rev.
TENN. L. Rev. 62; 6 Wis. L. REv. 106).
(1891).
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incapacity to sue is unsound." And further, "[s]uch immunity as the
parent may have from suit by the minor child for personal tort arises

from a disability to sue, and not from lack of violated duty. This
disability is not absolute. It is imposed for the protection of family
control and harmony, and exists only where a suit or the prospect of a
suit might disturb the family relations. Stated from the viewpoint of
the parent, it is a privilege, but only a qualified one. It is not an answer
to a suit for an intentional injury, maliciously inflicted."
Dunlap v. Dunlap, referred to in a later Maryland decision52 as a
landmark opinion, involved, however, only negligence and presented
moreover even narrower questions of emancipation and insurance
which will be considered later. That the general rule that no action
can be maintained in matters of ordinary negligence remained unaffected was re-affirmed in the later New Hampshire case of Levesque
53

v. Levesque.

In Cannon v. Cannon,5 4 the New York court held that a parent
was not subject to a tort action for injuries to his minor child (a passenger in the automobile) resulting from ordinary negligence because
the duty imposed by law "to support and discipline the child and to
prescribe a course of conduct designed to promote his health, education
and recreation, accords to the parent a wide discretion." In respect
to the exercise of that discretion and the performance of those duties
parents "are held to no higher standard of care than the measure
of their own physical, mental and financial abilities to provide for the
well-being of their child. .

.

.Indeed, if within the wide scope of daily

experiences common to the upbringing of a child a parent may be subjected to a suit for damages for each failure to exercise care commensurate with the risk-for each injury caused by inattention, unwise
choice or even selfishness-a new and heavy burden will be added to
parenthood." The court concluded in these words: "In the absence of
statutory sanction, we are not prepared, in cases where wilful misconduct by the parent is not a factor, to inject the disruptive risk of tort
liability.... ." Lower New York courts, following this intimation, have
held a parent subject to tort liability for wilful injuries.55
52.
53.
54.
55.

Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954) (35 B.U.L. REv. 205).
287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 336 (1942).
Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1952)

(4 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 167), 284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1954) (complaint must allege
the facts, not merely the words); Henderson v. Henderson, 11 Misc.2d 449, 169
N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (involving New Jersey law which was presumed
to be the same as the common law of New York) ; Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc.
551, 92 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1949)

(must be alleged).
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In Cowgill v. Boock56 it was held by the Oregon court that driving
a motor vehicle while intoxicated and ordering his child to ride with
him with resultant injury to the child was a wilful tort for which the
parent was liable. Approving the view that denying an action is a
"wholesome rule" for unintentional acts and harms suffered from
parental acts "within the scope of domestic relations" and from reasonable disciplinary punishment, the court said: "[I]f from wicked
motives a parent should brutally beat his minor child and thus maim
him for life, are we to say that he should be immune from liability
merely by reason of his parenthood?" "Whatever may be the early
common law rule, we should not be bound thereby unless it is supported
by reason and. logic. The law is not static. It is a progressive science."
But "[i]t is only in comparatively recent years that dissenting voices
have been raised in criticism of adhering to an absolute rule which in
some instances has resulted in a denial of justice." However, "[t]here
is a trend of modern decisions to depart from the general rule of nonliability where the injury sustained by an unemancipated minor child
is the result of a wilful or malicious tort."
7
In Mahnke v. Aloorey,
where it was alleged that the father had
killed the mother and a week later himself in the presence of their five
year old child whom he had kept with the mother's body, the Maryland
court, noting "that there is no home at all in which discipline and tranquillity are to be preserved," continued: "In these circumstances there
can be no basis for the contention that the daughter's suit against her
father's estate would be contrary to public policy, for the simple reason
that there is no home at all in which discipline and tranquillity are to
be preserved. . . . [When] the parent is guilty of acts which show
complete abandonment of the parental relation, the rule giving him
immunity from suit by the child, on the ground that discipline should
be maintained in the home, cannot logically be applied, for when he is
guilty of such acts he forfeits his parental authority and privileges,
including his immunity from suit. Justice demands that a minor child
shall have a right of action against a parent for injuries resulting from
cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs."
56. 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (30 B.U.L. Rxv. 580; 36 IOWA L. Rzv.
384; 5 MIAmi L.Q. 328; 22 Miss. L.J. 174; 16 Mo. L. Rev. 214; 29 N.C.L. Rxv.
214; 23 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 225; 25 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 118; 30 ORE. L. REv. 84;
14 U. DET. L.J. 94; 4 VAND. L. Rzv. 377).
57. 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (39 GEo. L.J. 664; 64 HARV. L. RV. 1208;
25 IND. L.J. 465; 50 MLcI.
L. REv. 168; 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 379; 29 T"x. L. REv.
974; 37 VA. L. REv. 625).
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In Wright v. Wright,5" it was also held in Georgia that a minor
child may maintain an action against his parent to recover damages for
injuries resulting from wilful and malicious acts (alleged driving at
excessive speed after having become intoxicated, endangering his child
passenger's life) the court expressing the matter thus: ". . . a parent
shall be liable for a wilful or malicious wrong against an unemancipated
minor child who is living with such parent and under his custody and
control if the wrong is such an act as would authorize a judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction depriving the parent of parental
power over the child. . . .What particular acts are necessary to divest
custody and bring about the loss of parental control, however, are
questions of fact and not questions of law, and, in an action such as the
one here under consideration, the jury and not the court is the proper
fact-finding tribunal. It cannot be said as a matter of law that a parent,
who becomes intoxicated and thereafter risks his life and the lives of
the general public by driving over the public roads in that condition at
an excessive rate of speed, and who in addition wilfully and maliciously
exposes his child's life and health to the dangers inherent in such conduct, would not be guilty of cruel treatment toward the child such as
might operate to forfeit his parental authority."
In Washington, Roller v. Roller59 has been overruled by Borst v.
Borst,6" in which the court made an extensive and elaborate review of
the entire question of personal injury tort actions by minor child against
the parent. The case, however, did not involve wilful or malicious misconduct. The court, nevertheless in making an exception to the rule of
no action where injury occurs from acts done in a business capacity
(to be considered later), and after noting that in situations of intentional harm or wilful misconduct "the recent decisions uniformly allow
the child a cause of action", disapproved as too broad the holding in
the Roller case: "In so doing, we have not lost sight of the suggestion
that the courts should wait until there is legislative sanction for such
an action. There is involved here no rule of property or contract, but
only a rule of nonliability benefiting a particular class of persons in
action ex delicto. There is no statutory sanction for the absolute rule
of imnmunity announced in Roller v. Roller. The purported reasons for
the absolute rule have been found, on analysis, to be without merit.
The true role of the legislature, under the circumstances, is to restrict
liability if it chooses to do so, as it did in the host-guest situation.
58. 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952) (15 GA. BAR J. 83).
59. 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
60. 41 Wash. 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) (38 CORN. L.Q. 462; 39 VA. L. Rev.
389; 28 WASH. L. Rev. 162).
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Where the proposal is to open the doors of the court, rather than to
close them, the courts are quite competent to act for themselves."
In Emery v. Emery," the California court, holding that a parent
is subject to an action in tort for wilful misconduct (complaint alleging
that a minor child was driving an automobile under the direction of his
father, was unskilled, had not slept for twenty-four hours, and that
speed was excessive-facts known to parent), quoted with approval
Davis v. Smith6 2 where the court,: after observing that "in more recent
years it would seem that the trenl of judicial decisions and the thinking
of legal writers has been toward the amelioration and limitation of the
rule [of no civil action], based upon a recognition that the Hewlett,
McKelvey, and Roller cases were wrongly decided," stated: "The
parental non-liability is given as a means of enabling the parent to
discharge his duties in preserving the domestic tranquillity. It should
not shield the parent where the matter arises from a 'non-parental'
occurrence, or where the parent commits an atrocious assault outraging
the duties imposed upon him as a parent by society."
In Nudd v. Matsoukas, ' after noting that the question was a novel
one in Illinois, the court.held that a cause of action will lie for wilful
and wanton misconduct, saying "To tolerate such misconduct and
deprive a child of relief will not foster family unity but will deprive
a person of redress, without any corresponding social benefit, for an
injury long recognized at common law." And further "We do not feel
that the announcement of this doctrine should be left to the legislature.
The doctrine of parental immunity, as far as it goes, was created by the
courts. It is especially for them to interpret and modify that doctrine to correspond with prevalent considerations of public policy and
social needs." 64
On the other hand the New Jersey court6 5 approved the view that
wilful injuries should be left to be redressed by loss of custody or to the
criminal law. An Arkansas case 6 took the view that a minor child
cannot maintain a personal injury tort action against a natural parent
even for voluntary acts. And the Hewlett case has been referred to
with approval in a Mississippi case (although the case involved only
61. 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
62. 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
63. 7 Ill.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956) (55 MICH. L. REv. 463).
64. It seems that actions for wilfully inflicted injuries might possibly be maintained in some other states. Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954) ; Luster
v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938) (18 B.U.L. REv. 468; 7 FORDHAM
L. REV. 459; 24 VA. L. R-v. 298; 86 U. PA. L. REv. 909).
65. Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 At. 153 (1935) (10 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 343).
66. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (18 Tgx. L. REv. 92;
1 WASH. & LEE, L. REV. 136).
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the question of ordinary negligence). 67 So too the McKelvey case has
been adhered to in Tennessee (again in cases involving only the question of negligence). 6" Similarly other courts have followed their earlier
decisions where ordinary negligence was involved.6"
However significant the departure from the Hewlett, McKelvey,
and Roller cases in the matter of malicious, wilful and wanton parental
conduct, it would seem that the views expressed in some of the cases
may go too far. It is doubtful that drunken and reckless driving even
though resulting in injury would necessarily impair domestic harmony
in any disruptive sense. It is also doubtful that such conduct would in
itself be regarded as sufficient basis for depriving a parent of custody
of his child. And even if it is to be so regarded, it should have resulted
in such deprivation or ending of custody and parental control. Otherwise a tort action by the child could involve as much disruption of
domestic harmony and parental discipline as in other situations. By
such criteria the decision in Mahnke v. Moore,"0 for example, seems
correct, and that in Roller v. Roller,71 incorrect.
Courts that have held a tort cause of action for personal injuries
may be maintained by a minor child against his parent for wilful
injuries have made it plain that no such action can be maintained for
negligence in respect to domestic activities or for negligence in the
exercise of parental rights or performance of parental duties whether
the negligence consists of affirmative conduct or of failure to act. 7' The
parental conduct is to be regarded as either not tortious or else privileged; or the reason may be that policy is not strong enough to require
departure from the supposed general rule of no liability. Maintenance
of the home and conduct therein would clearly be domestic activities.
Operation of a family car has also been considered as either a domestic
205).

67. Durham v. Durham, 227 Miss. 76, 85 So.2d 807 (1956)

(31 TuL. L. REv.

68. Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952); Graham v.
Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945); Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553,
89 S.W.2d 751 (1936).
69. Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952) (5 So. CAR. L.
REv. 294) ; Goldsmith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931) (27 ILL. L.
REv. 314) following Small v. Morrison. See also Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Super.
125, 110 A.2d 492 (1954) following Mesite v. Kirchstein.
And in Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (19 PITT. L. REv.
681; 31 TEMPLE L.Q. 233; 3 VILL. L. REV. 577; 35 U. DETROIT L. Rzv. 528), the
court stated the matter of denial of an action broadly as a rule precluding "an
action in tort for damages against its parent because of any negligent conduct" and
approved it as sound, being "based on the sound principle of public policy to promote
family unity and avoid family discord and disturbance."
70. Supra note 57.

71. Supra note 41.
72. Supra cases passim. See also, Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954) (20 Mo. L. REV. 214; 35 TEX. L. Rzv. 407) ; Strahorn v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956).
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activity or coming within parental right-duty to rear the child. Most
of the cases involving ordinary negligence and denying an action have
been cases of minor children who were passengers in the family car.7"
In Ball v. Ball, 4 the Wyoming court denied an action for injuries
suffered while the child was a passenger in the parent's plane which
was piloted by the parent. And in Baker v. Baker," a fifteen-months
old child who was allegedly injured when the father backed his automobile over her in the driveway was denied an action.76 In Strahorn
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.," characterized by the court as a case of first
impression in Delaware, a minor child brought an action against a store
for injuries sustained on an escalator and the store sought to join the
father as a contribution tort-feasor because of his alleged contributory
negligence. Joinder was denied on the ground that there could be no
action by the child against the father.
Even if no liability for ordinary negligence, either by non-action
or by affirmative conduct, is confined to domestic activities or to the
exercise of parental rights and the performance of parental duties, it
would seem that such conduct could transcend these bounds just as in
the case of wilful injury, and fall within the same reasons for allowing
an action. Extreme neglect, for example, may be grounds for deprivation of custody even though not wilful.78
In cases antedating Hewlett v. George,79 holding subject to liability
in tort a person in loco parentis, the decisions were made to depend
upon whether a natural parent would be subject to liability for the same
kind of conduct.8 0 Numerous cases have been since decided on this
73. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (Md. Law) (32 MARQ.
L. Rrv. 289; 12 U. DET. L.J. 57); Zaccari v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 50 (D.
Md. 1955) ; Owens v. Automobile Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937) ;
Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Super. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (1954) ; Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev.
200, 267 P.2d 240 (1954) ; Redding v. Redding, 235 N.C. 638, 70 S.E.2d 676 (1952);
Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 Pac. 7 (1931) (20 CALiv. L. Rev. 342);
Lund v. Olsen, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931) (16 MINN. L. Riv. 323);
Goldsmith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931) (27 ILL. L. Rev. 314);
Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931) (NoTRs DAME LAw. 259;
37 W. VA. L.Q. 315). See Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152
(1952). In Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954) (15 LA. L. RZv. 478; 16
OHIO ST. L.J. 125), the father's car was operated by another member of the family.
See also, Silverman v. Siliverman, 145 Conn. 663, 145 A.2d 826 (1958).
74. 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954).
75. 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953). See also Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass.
480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938) (18 B.U.L. Rnv. 468; 7 FORDHAM L. Rzv. 459; 24 VA.
L. REv. 298; 86 U. PA. L. Rnv. 909).
76. See also Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954) (35
B.U.L. Rxv. 205).
77. 50 Del. 50, 123 A.2d 107 (1956).
78. Cf., Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885).
79. Supra note 39.
80. Gould v. Christianson, 5 Fed. Cas. 636 (No. 5) (S.D.N.Y. 1836) ; Fitzgerald
v. Northcote, 4 F. & F. 656 (N.P. 1865) ; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859). See
also, Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885).
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premise. In some, therefore, it has been held that an action may be maintained for wilful injury,"1 in some that an action cannot be maintained
for negligent injury." As stated in London Guarantee & Accident Co.
v. Smith, 3 "Whatever may be said of the merits of the rule which
bars a personal injury action in ordinary negligence by an unemancipated minor against his parent-and it has been criticized effectively by
respectable authorities-; as long as it stands unchanged there is no
justification for refusing to apply the rule to step-parents who genuinely
stand in loco parentis to the child of a spouse by a former marriage."
But in Brown v. Cole,84 it was held by the Arkansas court that an
adopted child could maintain an action against the adoptive parent for
pain and suffering due to poison allegedly administered, although an
action cannot be maintained against a natural parent even for voluntary
torts, reasoning "It will be observed that in these [adoption] statutes
n10 attempt is made to invest either the child or the adopting parents
with natural affections existing between blood relations, so the reason
for the rule that prevents natural children from suing natural parents
for voluntary torts committed upon them does not exist between
adopted children and adoptive parents." And in Adams v. Nadel,"5
where a minor child was allegedly negligently injured while a passenger in defendant's car and was later adopted by the defendant, it
was held that the child could maintain an action, although such action
could not be maintained if the defendant had been the child's natural
parent. Although the New York adoption statute antedated the injury,
the court relied upon provisions to the effect that "the statute shall not
affect any proceedings now pending or impair any accrued right." This
is the only case that has been found that presents a situation analogous
to ante-nuptial torts.8"
81. Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956) (automobile)
Calway v. Williamson, 130 Conn. 575, 36 A.2d 377 (1944) (92 U. PA. L. Rev. 466)
(schoolmaster); Gillett v. Gillett, 335 P.2d 736 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (excessive punishment).
82. Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 300 Pac. 7 (1931) (20 CALIF. L. Rev.
342); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 187 Atl. 153 (1935) (10 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rev. 343) (automobile).
83. 212 Minn. 211, 64 N.W.2d 781 (1954) (8 MINN. L. Rev. 71; 15 MINN. L.
REv. 126; 16 MINN. L. REv. 323), citing PROSSER, TORTS § 99 (2d ed. 1955).
84. 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (18 TEx. L. REv. 92; 1 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 136), referring to Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468
(1938).
85. 124 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
86. See 4 VILL. L. REv. 322-325 (1959). In Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425,
40 N.E.2d 336 (1942) it had been held that the question of cause of action is to
be determined as of the time of injury, a result consistent with the general rule
denying a cause of action to an adult child for injuries suffered during minority.
See infra note 154.
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Likewise it has generally been held that a parent cannot maintain
a personal injury tort action against the minor child. In Schneider v.
Schneider,7 which seems to have been the first case to decide the
question,"8 the Maryland court held that an action by a mother to recover damages for ordinary negligence resulting from operation of an
automobile could not be maintained since it would be inconsistent with
her being guardian of the child (presumably property) even if there
were no property. But it would not seem that the position of the
mother as guardian, either ad litem or general, should itself operate
as a bar, since presumably she could, interests being adverse, be replaced
by another person acting as guardian. In Oliveria v. Oliveria,s9
although the child was nineteen years old at the time of the alleged
automobile negligence injury the Massachusetts court held that such
action could not be brought since "In our opinion it is repugnant to
the prevailing sense of propriety that a mother should bring an action
at law against her own minor child, perhaps of tender years, for some
act of carelessness in the course of family life which it might seem that
the child had the capacity to foresee and to prevent." The usual reason
given for refusing to sanction such action is the danger of disturbing
domestic harmony,9" although sometimes the result is simply stated in
reciprocal terms-since a minor child cannot maintain an action against
the parent, the parent cannot against the child.9 ' Danger to parental
discipline and control is hardly a reason unless it should be considered
that such action would breed disrespect. A minor child has, however,
been held subject to an action for wilful injury."2
87. 160 Md. 18, 152 Ati. 499 (1930) (44 HARV. L. Rev. 995; 79 U. PA. L.
Rev. 649; 17 VA. L. Rev. 507).
88. See also Crosby v. Crosby, 260 App. Div. 651, 248 N.Y.S. 384 (1930) (31
CoLUM. L. Rev. 507; 16 CORNELL L.Q. 386).
89. 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 767 (1940)

(20 B.U.L. Rev. 394).

90. Duffy v. Duffy, 177 Pa. Super. 500, 178 Atl. 165 (1935) (15 B.U.L. Rev.
857; 11 NOTRE DAME LAW. 373) (case of first impression). See also, Detwiler v.
Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948) (9 U. PiTr. L. Rev. 310). In
Becker v. Rieck, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1959), it was held that a parent can
maintain a "derivative" action to recover for loss of services and medical expenses
resulting from an automobile negligence injury to one minor child while a passenger
in a car driven by another of the parent's minor children, since the matter involved
was in the nature of a property right "as to which there has never been any question that a parent may maintain an action."
91. Rines v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497 (1951) (Maine Law) ; Fidelity Say.
Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613 (1948) (1949 Wis. L. REv. 398). For
other cases of parent against child see Thompson v. Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky.
1954) ; Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 49, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956) ; Turner v. Carter, 169
Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1936). These cases have all arisen from automobile
operation.
92. Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932) (alleged excessive and
reckless speed in operating an automobile relying on the child against parent case of
Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913)). And an emancipated child
(at time of injury) is subject to action. See Cafaro v. Cafaro, 118 N.J.L. 123,
184 Atl. 179 (1936) and infra p. 556.
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Where the injury has resulted in death of the plaintiff (either
child or parent) or where action is brought on behalf of the beneficiaries
of the deceased child or parent who would have been in the position of
plaintiff had death not resulted (in which case a living child may be
suing a parent or vice versa as beneficiary or administrator of the
decedent) the wrongful death statute may be of the type that creates
a cause of action upon death as distinguished from permitting a cause
of action to survive and perhaps not in all respects the same as the
4
9
deceased's cause of action had he lived. a In Oliveria v. Oliveria,9
two actions were brought by a mother against a minor child to recover
for her own injuries and for the death of the husband-father both
resulting from operation of an automobile. it was held that the
mother's own action could not be maintained but her action for wrongful death could be maintained although the father, had he lived, could
not have maintained his action against the child. "The reasons of
public policy which forbid actions between parent and minor child for
personal injury caused by negligence apply with diminished force where
the action is for death caused either by negligence or by wilful, wanton
or reckless act and is brought not only for the benefit of a surviving
wife or husband but of all the next of kin by an executor or administrator appointed by the Probate Court ....
But there are still stronger
reasons for a distinction. The right of action for death is created by
statute and is governed by the terms of the statutes. . . . Although an
action under it wears the aspect of a civil suit ... yet the damages are
assessed wholly with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant and constitute in effect a fine levied upon him for his wrongful
conduct." "There are no exceptions based upon family relationship." 95
93. For husband and wife cases involving the distinction see 4 VILL. L. Riv.
321 (1959).
94. 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 767 (1940) (20 B.U.L. Rgv. 394). Also, "the
defendant in this case would ordinarily owe a duty to exercise some degree of care
toward persons riding in an automobile which he was driving. The only reason
why the deceased, if living, could not recover . . . for negligence would be a public
policy which forbids the bringing of an action . . . we would be interpreting the
word 'negligence' as used in the statute too narrowly and too technically were we
to say that it does not include a case where all the elements of duty and careless
failure to perform it would be present, if it were not that the relation . . . would
have imposed a bar ......

95. See also, Hale v. Hale, 312 Ky. 867, 230 S.W.2d 610 (1950) (39 Ky. L.J.
479; 29 Tnx. L. Rev. 560); Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939) (18
CHI. KFNT L. REv. 211; 44 DICK. L. Rgv. 143; 13 TeMP. L.Q. 529; 18 Tnx. L. Rev.
93; 6 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 41) (action for child against mother for death of father);
Perkins v. Robertson 140 Cal. App. 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956) (action for child
against father for death of mother). Cf., Munsert v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
294 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1938) (37 MICH. L. Rv. 658).
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If, however, the statute is a "survival" type limiting the remedy to
instances where the deceased could have maintained the action had he
lived (as in the case of death before suit but not resulting from the
injury) or creates a cause of action for wrongful death in terms of
decedent's own right of action, the result logically would be that no
such proceeding could be brought or maintained if the decedent child
or parent could not have maintained an action.
If the defendant has died before suit, either as the result of the
negligence that has injured the plaintiff (who survived) or from other
causes, the matter logically is one of the survival of the cause of action.9 7
The Wisconsin court9" has given, however, additional policy reasons
for denying action against a deceased parent. Characterizing such
action "shocking to our concept of justice," the court said, "To hold
that an unemancipated minor may not recover from its parent, if living,
for the latter's negligence, but may do so if the parent die, would open
wide the door and permit unemancipated minors to file claims of all
kinds, sounding in tort, against the estates of their parents or to bring
actions based thereon against the administrators of their parent's
estates. . . . We consider that such a far-reaching step, so at variance
with common law, should not be taken by this court." The court
alluded to the possibility of "serious controversies between, and ill
feeling among, other surviving children" and that such actions "might
take from a surviving widow and other infant children, the very essentials of their support."
In Pennsylvania, however, it has been held,99 although the statute
was in terms of "action as though decedent were alive," that the action
10 0
can be maintained since the home and its harmony, has ceased.
96. Owens v. Automobile Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937);
Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954) (15 LA. L. Rev. 478; 16 OHIO
ST. L.J. 125); Strong v. Strong, 70 Nev. 200, 267 P.2d 240 (1954) (child against
mother for death of father) ; Goldsmith v. Samet, 201 N.C. 574, 160 S.E. 835 (1931)
(27 ILL. L. RUv. 314) ; Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 49, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956) ; Turner
v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1936); Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252
Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613 (1948) (1949 Wis. L. Rev. 398) ; Cf. Durham v. Durham,
227 Miss. 76, 85 So.2d 807 (1956) (31 TuL. L. REv. 205).
97. Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) ; Lasecki v. Kabara,
235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940). See also, Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425,
40 N.E.2d 236 (1942).
98. Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).

99. Brower v. Webb, 5 Pa. D.&C.2d 193 (C. P. Phila. 1955). The same result
had been reached previously (by construction of the statute) in Minkin v. Minkin,
336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939) (18 CHI. KENT L. Rev. 211; 44 DICK. L. Rev.
143; 13 TeMp. L.Q. 529; 18 Tex. L. Rev. 93; 6 U. PITT. L. REv. 41 (an action by a
child against the mother for wrongful death of the father resulting Yfrom operation
of an automobile, one judge specially concurring on the ground that, although the

statute had not changed the law precluding tort actions between husband and wife
for personal injury, the action by the child was to vindicate a property right as to
which there is no policy precluding actions between parent and child.
100. See also Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954) ; Gortva v.
Feldman, 19 Mtgy. Rep. 97 (Pa. 1956) (immunity does not extend beyond life).
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In contrast with the reasons given in the Pennsylvania cases for
allowing an action where there has been death of one of the parties
it was held in Parks v. Parks... that no action could be maintained
either by the child for his own damages or by the father for "consequential" damages where it appeared that the child (less than six months
old) had been so badly injured (again a case of an automobile operated
by the mother) that it would have to be in an institution for the rest
of its life: "With death there comes an irreversible end and termination
of the family relationship and such relationship lives only in memory;
confinement in an institution may be only temporary and it lacks the
finality of death in the severance of the family relationship. Family
relationship is a two-way affair: parental devotion and care and affection may still flow toward the member of the family confined in the
institution and this phase of family relationship may well be severed by
litigation between the child and the parent."
IV.
The parent causing injury to the child (or vice versa) may be an
employee of a third person. If no action can be maintained between
parent and child, may the employer nevertheless be subject to liability
on principles of respondeat superior?
In the husband-wife situation a number of cases have held that
the employer is not liable unless the employee is liable, and where there
is no right of action against the employee-husband (or wife) there can
be no liability on the employer's part. 10 2 The contrary, however, was
held in Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 10 apparently the first case
so holding, on the ground that the marital relation did not make lawful
acts that would otherwise be unlawful or wrongs, and that the
employee-spouse is simply exempt or has a personal immunity from
liability to the injured spouse,'10 4 and moreover the employee's act is
the employer's act; true, the employer would have a remedy against the
For death of both plaintiff and defendant see Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434,
187 S.W.2d 622 (1945) ; Chesonis v. Chesonis, 4 Pa. D.&C.2d 449 (C.P. Sull. 1953).
101. 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (19 U PITT. L. REv. 681; 31 TtmP.
L.Q. 233; 3 VILL. L. REv. 577; 35 U. DFT. L. Rtv. 528).
102. 4 VILL. L. REv. 325 (1959).
103. 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928) (29 COLuM. L. Rsv. 222; 42 HARV. L.
Riv. 697; 24 ILL. L. Riv. 232; 27 MICH. L. Rzv. 830; 6 N.Y.U.L. Rsv. 53). See
also 43 HARV. L. Rtv. 1049 (1930).
104. It would not seem that at common law it was considered a matter of
immunity, but rather no cause of action-no tort between husband and wife, just
as there could not be a contract made between them; hence in the theory no civil
wrong. A spouse was subject to the criminal lawa wrong against the state;
also to divorce d mensa et thoro for a marital wrong. See Phillips v. Barnet, 1
Q.B.D. 436 (1876) per Blackburn, J.
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employee, but it is based on breach of an independent duty owed by the
employee to the employer. The result reached in the Schubert case
has been reached in a number of later cases both in England and in the
United States'0 5 and is the view stated in the American Law Institute's
Restatement of Agency.1" 6 But even if the principle of respondeat
superior rests on these reasons, and if the injuring spouse's position is
regarded as that of a personal immunity from liability to the plaintiffspouse, it is apparent from the point of view of the domestic relation
that the right of the employer to indemnity or to discharge the employee
is in fact an indirect liability of the injuring spouse to the injured
spouse that is capable of just as much domestic disruption as direct
liability, unless the employer has liability insurance coverage.
The Schubert case was decided in 1928. In 1930 the Connecticut
case of Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp. °7 followed the
Schiubert case in a parent-child situation, and there is an Alabama case
to the same effect.'
The opposite view has been taken in Georgia'"°
and in Tennessee."' In Graham v. Miller,"' the court regarding the
question as not an open one in Tennessee and rejecting the Chase view
observed that to hold the employer and the employee-parent liable as
joint-tortfeasors where the employer would have a right of recovery
against the employee "would be to countenance an encircling movement
when a frontal attack upon the parent is prohibited." A similar difference in points of view has occurred where the parent was not an employee but was driving an automobile of another with permission of
the owner." 2 And in Briggs v. City of Philadelphia"3 an action was
brought by a minor child against a city for injuries caused by defects
in a sidewalk. The city brought in the father as a defendant primarily
liable. The child recovered judgment against the city and the city
recovered a judgment against the father. The only issue involved,
reasoned the court, was whether there was liability on the part of the
105. 4 VILL. L. REv. 326-329 (1959).
106. Section 217(2), comment b.
107. 111 Conn. 377, 150 At!. 107 (1930).
108. Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908 (1938). And
see Chesonis v. Chesonis, 4 Pa. D.&C.2d 449 (C.P. Sull. 1953) referring to Koontz
v. Messer, 320 Pa. 487, 181 At!. 792 (1935).
109. Fowles v. Ray-O-Vac. Co., 53 Ga. App. 338, 183 S.E. 210 (1935).
110. Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W.2d 622 (1945).
111. Supra note 110.
112. Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S.W.2d 37 (1952)
(owner
not liable); Schomber v. Tait, 207 Misc. 328, 140 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1955)
(owner/liable).
113. 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 Ati. 871 (1934). The parent was a tenant in
occupation and control of the premises. Judgment given by the trial court against
the city in favor of the owner of the premises was reversed in the superior court.
This part of the case was in turn reversed in 316 Pa. 48, 173 Atd. 316 (1934) (82
IT. PA. 1,. Rv. 773; 1 U. PITT. L. Rgv. 22).
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city to the child and "that issue was not extended by introducing
additional defendants" and "while the minor may not sue her father,
she is not barred from suing another who is liable."

Where the parent is a member of a partnership it is generally
held that no action can be mtaintained against the partnership by the
injured child if an action cannot be maintained by the child against
a parent." 4
V.
Dunlap,"5

In Dunlap v.
a sixteen year old boy who was living at
home and attending high school but who was employed during summer
vacation by his father, a building contractor, for the same wages as
those paid other workmen, was injured while so employed by collapse
of a staging. The father's employer's liability insurance listed the child
as an employee, and premiums paid were a certain percentage of the
payroll. It was held that the action could be maintained against the
father (a necessary prerequisite to insurance recovery) since the father
had not only emancipated the child" 6 but had arranged for insurance
against the specific risk. The court further observed that the suit was
for a negligent wrong "growing out of the relation of master and
servant." Whether as a result of this statement, or of the Schubert
case, or of the developing exception to the general rule of non-liability
for wilful injury as being outside the parent-child relation, there have
been emerging cases holding that a minor child may maintain an action
against its parent when the latter is acting in a business or vocational capacity, especially when the specific risk is covered by liability
insurance.
In Lusk v. Lusk,"' a school girl was injured by the negligent
operation of a school bus owned by her father and driven by one of his
employees. The father operated the bus under a contract with the city
which required indemnity insurance. It was held that the action could
be maintained. The court expressed itself "not impressed with the
idea that the ills accredited to such actions can be obviated merely by
suing the parent in his business capacity [involving distinctions mean114. Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn. 537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932) (16 MINN. L.
Rev. 872) ; Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 637 (Tex Civ. App. 1954) (20 Mo.
L. Rev. 214; 35 Tex. L. REv. 407). Cf., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103
N.E.2d 743 (1952) infra p. 543. See 4 VILL. L. Rev. 328 (1959) for the husbandwife cases.
115. 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ati. 905 (1930) (10 B.U.L. Rev. 584; 44 HARv. L.
REV. 135; 15 MIN N. L. Rev. 126; 3 TtNN. L. Rev. 62; 6 Wis. L. Rev. 106).
116. See infra p. 551.
117. 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
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ing nothing to the child or to the parent]. .. . But a different situation
arises when the parent is protected by insurance in his vocational
capacity."
The same result was reached in Worrell v. Worrell. 8 where the
minor child, a college student, was injured while a passenger in a bus
owned by her father and operated as a common carrier. Admitting
that liability insurance carried by the owner "creates no cause of action
where no cause of action exists in [its] absence" the court nevertheless
concluded that, "The injuries were occasioned in the performance of
the duties of a common carrier, not in the parental relation. As a
common carrier, he owed a fixed duty to persons occupying the status
of passengers. For the protection of such passengers, in the event of
the violation of his duty, the State required him to carry liability
insurance. Can it be that his duties to other passengers are higher than
his obligations to his own child ?"
In Signs v. Signs n. a seven year old child brought action against
her father and his partner for injuries sustained when a fire burst out
at the gasoline pump on defendant's business premises which were also
part of the home premises. After an extensive review of tort cases
between parent and child the court held that the action could be maintained against the father, if negligent, saying, "In view of the changed
conditions to which we have referred, we have come to the conclusion
that, if there ever was any justification for the rule announced in
Mississippi in 1891, that justification has now disappeared and . . .
an unemancipated child should have as clear a right to maintain an
action in tort against his parent in the latter's business or vocational
capacity as such child would have to maintain an action in relation to
his property rights." In a later proceeding in the same case it was
found that the child had been warned to keep away and it was held
that where the child is in the position of a trespasser or a warned
invitee, the father is under no greater liability than he would have
been to the child of another.12 °
In Borst v. Borst 2 ' it was held again in an elaborate opinion that
a complaint alleging that plaintiff-minor child suffered injuries when
its parent, operating a motor vehicle for business purposes, ran over
118. 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (8 DuKE B.A.J. 58; 2 GA. B.J. 62;
28 GEo. L.J. 430; 24 MINN. L. REv. 286; 14 TUL. L. REv. 468; 26 VA. L. REv.

235).
119. 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952) (3 ALA. L. REV. 173; 2 Burp.
L. REV. 166; 6 MIAMI L.Q. 617; 10 WASH. L. REV. 121).
120. 161 Ohio St. 241, 118 N.E.2d 411 (1954).
121. 41 Wash. 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952) (38 CORNELL L.Q. 462; 39 VA. L. REv.
389; 28 WASH. L. Riv. 162).
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it in the street, stated a cause of action, saying "It cannot be denied
that suits by minors against their parents to recover damages sustained
as a result of the parent's negligence in carrying on a business or
vocation may disturb family tranquillity. But is that a sufficient
ground for denying a cause of action as a matter of law? . . . Minors

have always been permitted to sue their parents in matters affecting
property and contract rights.... ." Observing that the activity whereby
the child was injured may have had nothing to do with parental control
and discipline, the court continued, "And even if such a suit should tend
to impair family discipline in some degree, that would not seem to call
for application of the immunity rule any more than in cases where the
child sues to enforce a property right."
There are cases, however, that have rejected the "business or
vocational capacity" distinction. In Luster' v. Luster,12 2 where it
appeared that the child had been injured when the parent's truck backed
over him on the parent's store premises, it was held by the Massachusetts court that the action could not be maintained: "We cannot
follow the plaintiff's contention that this case is taken out of the general
rule because, as it is said, the circumstances of the accident were not
connected with the father's duty to rear his child or with the conduct
of his domestic establishment and were such that any other child in the
plaintiff's position would have been injured. We do not perceive how
it would be possible in practice to draw such a line of distinction as
that here suggested. The objections based upon public policy reach to
and include this case."
In Epstein v. Epstein,123 a case of first impression in New York,
a lower court held that a cause of action can be maintained for negligent
injuries sustained at a parent's place of business, distinguishing Cannon
v. Cannon'24 and following Signs v. Signs. 2 5 The holding was, how27
26
ever, reversed by the Appellate Division. 1 In Aboussie v. Aboussie,1

where it appeared that the child suffered injuries to its hand in an
electric fan in a retail store in which the father was a partner, a Texas
court declined to adopt the business or vocational capacity distinction.
122. 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938) (18 B.U.L. REv. 468; 7 FORDHAM
L. REv. 459; 24 VA. L. REv. 298; 86 U. PA. L. Rev. 909).
123. 124 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1953) (18 ALBANY L. Rev. 270; 23 FORDHAM L.
REv. 110).
124. Supra note 54.

125. Supra notes 119, 120.
126. 283 App. Div. 855, 129 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1954).
127. 270 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (20 Mo. L. REv. 214; 35 TEx.
L. Rev. 407).
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VI.
Just as in interspousal cases many if not most of the parent-child
cases reaching appellate courts have been cases of personal injuries
arising from the operation of automobiles, and in most of those the
inj:red plaintiff has been a passenger. Perhaps in a high percentage
of such cases the operator or owner of the car has a policy of insurance
covering his liability. Indeed, it has been said by the Massachusetts
court,128 with some apparent cynicism, that such a parent-child litigation: "was unknown here until the recent extension of liability insurance held out the hope that occurrences within the home circle might
become a source of net profit to the family. The great weight of existing
authority, most of which is found in very recent cases, is against such
an action."
If the defendant, having liability insurance coverage,129 is legally
liable, the insurer would be liable to him (and under some policies
subject to direct suit by the injured party) by way of indemnity or
reimbursement (limited by the maximum amount of coverage) for
damages recovered or recoverable by the injured person. If there is
no legal liability on the part of the insured, there would be none on the
part of the insurer. The insurance covers legal liability, does not
create it."' The decisions are all to this effect in the parent-child automobile personal injury cases. 3 '
128. Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E.2d 767 (1940)
(20 B.U.L.
REv. 394).
129. Insurance may be available to cover accidents in the legal sense of the
term, i.e., irrespective of fault. Such coverage is usually for an explicit amount,
for death, and/or for injuries to specific parts of the body, and also for loss of time
for a maximum period. An automobile liability policy often contains emergency
medical payments coverage, irrespective of legal liability, or may in terms include
members of the insured's family. These are not liability policies and their coverage
may fall far short of the monetary injury suffered in an action based on legal
liability. On the other hand the policy may expressly exclude certain risks such as
injuries to members of the insured's family.
130. See 4 VILL. L. REv. 329-335 for a discussion of husband-wife cases.
131. Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (32 MARQ. L. REv.
289; 12 U. D8r. L.J. 57); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (19
U. PITT. L. REv. 681; 31 TEMP. L.Q. 233; 3 VILL. L. REv. 577; 35 U. DET. L. REv.
528) ; Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953) ; Rines v. Rines, 97
N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497 (1951) ; Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d
613 (1948) ; Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (8 DUKE B.A.J.
58; 2 GA. B.J. 62; 28 GEo. L.J. 430, 24 MINN. L. REv. 286; 14 TUL. L. REv.
468; 26 VA. L. REv. 235) ; Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938) ;
Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938) (18 B.U.L. REv. 468; 7
FORDHAM L. REv. 459; 24 VA. L. REv. 298; 86 U. PA. L. REv. 909); Owens v.
Automobile Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Lund v. Olsen, 183
Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931) (16 MINN. L. REV. 323) ; Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162
Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948) (9 U. PITT. L. REv. 310) ; Brower v. Webb,
5 Pa. D.&.C.2d 193 (C.P. Phila. 1955); Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc. 1053, 112
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1952) (4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 167) ; 284 App. Div. 652, 134 N.Y.S.2d 437
(1954).
In Addison v. Employers Mut. Liab. Co., 64 So.2d 484 (La. App. 1953) it
was held that a wife injured by her husband could recover from the insurer who
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It is apparent that the two reasons which have come to be regarded
as the principal, if not the only, ones for denying a cause of action in
tort between parent and minor child, viz. danger of disrupting or
disturbing domestic tranquillity and interference with the exercise of
parental rights and the performance of parental duties in the matter of
rearing and disciplining the child, have no application when the action
is, in substance if not in form, against an insurance company which
12
will pay the damages recovered. As was remarked in Lusk v. Lusk'
the action is not unfriendly, a recovery by the child is no loss to the
parent, their interests unite in favor of recovery, no strained family
relations will follow, family harmony is assured instead of disrupted;
but, as the court went on to say of the facts of that particular case,
"without hint of 'domestic fraud and collusion' (charged in some
cases)." But in the view of the Pennsylvania court, expressed in Parks
v. Parks,"' the rule that a minor child "cannot maintain an action in
tort for damages against its parent because of any negligent conduct
on the part of the parent is sound" in part because "it prevents possible
collusive action between parent and child in situations where the liability ... is covered by insurance." This possible difficulty has been
discussed more in the husband-wife than in the parent-child cases.'
However, the mere possibility of fraud and collusion has not been
generally considered more relevant than in other situations where there
might be thought a similar danger."'
The rule of no tort liability for personal injury because of domestic
relation and the wide use of (and even insistence upon in states where
it is made compulsory) automobile "liability" insurance present a
conflict, of which courts apparently are becoming aware.
In Harralson v. Thomas"6 it was said: "Recent cases in this
Court have made us aware that certain established principles of tort
liability are somewhat awkwardly applied in automobile negligence
cases where liability insurance is shown or may exist. The increasing
had undertaken to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured "shall
become legally obligated to pay", since a tort had occurred but the husband had a
"personal immunity". See also, McLain v. National Cas. Co., 28 So.2d 680 (La. App.
1947). No parent-child case has been found involving this view. The insurance case
is distinguishable from the employee-employer cases. It is often said, as in the
Schubert case, that the doctrine of respondeat superior rests on the principle that he
who acts through another acts himself. Whatever the correct explanation, the
relation of the master to the servant's acts is entirely different from the relation of
the insurer to the insured's acts.
132. 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
133. 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
134. 4 VILL. L. REv. 330-332, and see 43 HARV. L. Rev. 1030, 1052, 1076 (1930).
135. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 At. 905 (1930) ; Chiuchiolo v. New
England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atl. 540 (1930).
136. 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954) (15 LA. L. Rlv. 478; 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 125).
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complexity of highway travel has brought on many new problems in
the adjudication of rights, and perhaps the automobile in all its aspects
should be placed in a category different from that of other instrumentalities. However, that is a matter for legislative action and this Court
is not inclined to initiate a new set of motor vehicle rules."
And in Levesque v. Levesque: 3 7 "We do not believe that the
existence of liability insurance should create a right of action where
none would otherwise exist. .

.

. If however the almost general exist-

ence of liability insurance has so materially changed the circumstances
which militated against such suits that a change in the public policy
now prevailing in this state should be made, we think that is a matter
for the legislature to determine rather than being within the province
of this court."
As early as 1929, in Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins.
138
Fairchild, J., concurring in holding that no recovery could be
Co.,
had against a father's automobile liability insurer, had this to say:
"This case poses a problem which needs a better solution than we find
is in the province of the court. Perhaps it would be no more disruptive
of the family relationship to destroy the father's immunity from an
action for personal injuries brought by his child than it has been to
destroy the husband's immunity from similar action by his wife.
Perhaps, because the problem more frequently arises in connection with
injuries caused by the operation of automobiles, it would be better
simply to require that the automobile liability insurer of a parent be
directly liable to an injured child, notwithstanding the parent's immunity by reason of his parenthood. I agree, however, with the
majority of the court that in this situation the choice of solutions
should be made by the legislature."
The germs of two solutions (one of which would require only
agreement, the other, legislative action) are also to be found, perhaps
not so clearly, in two other cases, one earlier than the Wisconsin case.
In Small v. Morrison,139 the court observed that an insurance
policy could have been obtained "which would have given the instant
plaintiff [a minor child] a right to maintain an action against the
indemnity company, without first suing the assured [parent]." Such
a suggestion is logically unsound if the risk assumed by the insurer
the only distinction is between the necessity
is against liability and if.
of a suit against the insured and the possibility of a direct action against
137. 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954) (35 B.U.L. Riv. 205).
138. 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W.2d 867 (1929).
139. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923).
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the insurer; if, however, by the words "instant plaintiff" is meant the

assumption of a specific risk, the suggestion, which would appear in
part analogous to insurance in the business-vocational cases already
discussed,14 ° is of considerable interest.14 ' Perhaps more so is the
suggestion in Mesite v. Kirchstein4 2 similar to that of Fairchild, J.,
and which could be analogous to the theory of some wrongful death

statutes that create an independent statutory right: "When compulsory
insurance in automobile cases is required, and the legislative enactment
provides that recovery can be had directly from an insurer by one
injured through the negligence of the insured, the child might recover

of the insurer for the negligent injury inflicted by his parent. That is
not the action before us." A provision of direct recovery, however,
should include: "notwithstanding non-liability of the insured because of
the parent-child (or husband-wife) relation."
New York in 1937, where prior thereto a wife could not maintain
an action against her husband for a personal injury tort, enacted a
statute expressly providing that either husband or wife "has a right of
action" against the other for "wrongful or tortious acts" resulting in
injury to person or property, as if they were unmarried."4 ' The same
statute amended the Insurance Law.. 4 to provide (as subsequently
amended) 14 5 that no liability insurance policy shall be deemed to insure
against liability of an insured for death of or injury to the insured's
spouse or destruction of or injury to the insured's spouse's property
"unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the
policy." These statutory provisions, which are thought to be unique,
allow causes of action between spouses but attempt to guard against
possible insurance abuses.' 4 6 However, no liability insurance policies,
it is believed, have been issued with the inclusion clause.14 7 It is to be
regretted that therefore there has been no experience with such special
risk category, possibly contemplated by the statute to be a special one,
whereby to check prior assumptions of possible domestic fraud and
140. Supra p. 542.
141. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930): "But upon the
issue whether it was insured against, a distinction may be made between cases
where there is no evidence that such a result was intended, and those where it
affirmatively appears that the insuring contract was made with the specific liability
in mind. This goes upon the ground that in the case of general insurance contract
(if recognition of general liability for active intervention be refused) that no such
liability was convered. The then necessary intent to insure the specific risk is lacking."
142. 109 Conn. 77, 145 A.2d 753 (1929).
143. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 57.
144. N.Y. INS. LAW § 167, amended see note 145 infra.
145. N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(3).
146. Fuchs v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 171 Misc. 908, 14 N.Y.S.2d
387 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 603, 17 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1940).
147. 4 VILL. L.REv. 335 (1959).
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collusion or to establish premium costs for coverage. Nevertheless, the
New York statute presents an interesting compromise in the matter
of negligence liability, and an invitation to underwriters.
For some time a substantial number of states have allowed interspousal personal injury tort actions, without such insurance restriction
as that of New York, but insurance companies, it would seem, have no
statistics to compare such states with other states where such actions
cannot be maintained, or to show the number or amount of interspousal
automobile liability claims or their impact on general insurance liability
losses. It would seem that the rate effect, if any, is not regarded as
significant. 148 This attitude seems inconsistent with refraining from
writing such specific coverage.
There is no similar statute in New York covering inter-parentchild tort liability and none has been found in other states. If it is
thought that the term "wrongful or tortious acts" in the statute of that
state sufficiently copes with questions in the case of husband and wife of
whether particular conduct is tortious in the domestic establishment
(and the scope thereof) and with the matter of marital privilege, the
same general words would seem sufficient in the case of parent and
child. Perhaps not, and perhaps it would be impracticable to draft
satisfactorily more precise wording. But some statutory provisions
could nevertheless be drafted in the matter of liability insurance, for
example: (1) in states that have compulsory automobile liability insurance a required provision that the term "injured person" shall include
a person other than the operator of the car to whom the insured would
be legally liable except for the relation of parent and child (or husband
and wife) ; (2) in states that do not have such compulsory insurance,
an insurance policy provision to the same effect obtainable at the option
of the insured; (3) rates for such coverage to be established from time
to time; or (4) in lieu of the above it be required that a provision be
inserted in the policy expressly calling attention to the fact that parentchild (or husband-wife) injuries are not covered, 149 so that the insured
may obtain some form of accident insurance if he wishes. If there is
to be specific "quasi-liability" coverage the matter of the family passenger would require consideration and co-ordination with general
''guest" provisions.
148. 4 VILL. L. REv. 334 (1959).
149. Some insurance companies in some states use policies excluding members
of the insured's family. See Kick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 200 Tenn.
37, 289 S.W.2d 538 (1956). Statutory or other "guest" provisions may operate as
restrictions in respect to passengers in a car.
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It is to be noted that in addition to situations where the parent
(or child) is an employee of another.. general liability insurance has
already been affected by categories of liability between parent and child
that have developed in some states: wilful injuries (applied in some
instances of automobile operation)

;151

wrongful death;152 and voca-

tional capacity.' 5 It has also been affected in cases of emancipation to
be next considered.
VII.
Public policies precluding personal injury tort actions between
parent and child are considered to have no application when the child
is an adult at the time the injury is inflicted.'
The policy of preserving domestic tranquillity or at least not encouraging disharmony or
disruption may however still be involved. But if the controlling policy,
as it would seem to be, is non-interference in or to discourage impairment of the exercise of parental rights and the performance of parental
duties, nonetheless such rights and duties (at least at common law)
terminate when the child reaches majority. And in Hewlett v.
George,'5 5 the case that started the decisions holding no cause of
action, mention was made of emancipation: "Whether [the plaintiff]
had resumed her former place in her mother's house, and the relationship, with its reciprocal rights and duties, of a minor child to her
parent, does not sufficiently appear. If by her marriage the relation
of parent and child had been finally dissolved, in so far as that relationship imposed the duty upon the parent to protect and care for and
control, and the child to aid and comfort and obey, then it may be the
child could successfully maintain an action against the parent for
personal injuries." In Taubert v. Taubert"' it was held that a "fully"
emancipated minor child could maintain an action, and the question
150.
151.
152.
153.

Supra p.
Supra p.
Supra p.
Supra p.

540.
531.
538.
542.

154. Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 218 A.2d 617 (1957). But see Rines
v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497 (1951) suggesting that a child over twenty-one
may not necessarily be emancipated, and referring to Skillin v. Skillin, 130 Me. 223,
154 Atl. 570 (1931). No action can be maintained after majority for acts which
occurred during minority if the relation precludes

its being maintained during

minority. Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935) (10 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 343); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 143 N.E. 128 (1924) (No action
after majority for acts which occurred during minority). Cf., Cannon v. Cannon, 287
N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942). See also, Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W.
640 (1903).
155. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
156. 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908) (injury suffered while working outside the home in parent's factory).
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of emancipation was also raised in Mesite v. Kirchstein.1 57 In Dunlap
v. Dunlap, in holding that a minor child could maintain an action
against the parent, the court based the result in part on emancipation
and in part upon insurance against a specific risk in a business enterprise, or more accurately a combination of the two. As to emancipation the court observed it is everywhere conceded that the act of the
father in emancipating the child results in a situation where "there is
no longer valid reason for denying recovery. When the right of discipline and family association have been surrendered, a rule intended
to preserve their integrity is not applicable." And furthermore, "The
release may be valid although it be partial only. It is not made invalid
by the fact that the child remains at home and continuesto be supported
by his father. .

.

. There seems to be no distinction in principle

between permitting the father to create a situation where the son may
sue him for wages and allowing the son to complain of a violation of
the master's duty which was created by the valid contract for service.
As was said in Hall v. Hall, supra, the son labors 'as a hired servant.'
Every consideration of policy which is urged against this action is
equally applicable to the suit for wages. The maintenance of parental
authority and the preservation of the family peace are as much imperiled by one as by the other."' 5 8 It would seem, however, that not only
was the parental release partial but on the analogy to Hall v. Hall159
a right to maintain an action against the parent should also be partial,
that is,
confined within the area of the release. Parental custody and
control, it would seem, remained unaffected except in the masterservant relation that had been created. In that area, but that area only,
an action might be maintained even without the combined element
of insurance.
Since 1930 the contention of emancipation has been made in
numerous personal injury cases,"' and it may be that it is increasing.
157. 109 Conn. 77, 145 A.2d 753 (1929).
158. 84 N.H. 352, 365, 150 Atl. 905, 911 (1930).
159. 44 N.H. 293 (1862), a case where the father agreed to pay a minor daughter
wages as a domestic, and it was held that the daughter could maintain an action
to recover the wages promised. See also, Glover v. Glover, 319 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn.
App. 1958).
160. Perkins v. Robertson, 140 Cal. App. 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956); Wurth v.
Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. App. 1958); Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40
N.E.2d 236 (1942); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957); Glover v.
Glover, 319 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. App. 1958) ; DeLay v. DeLay, 337 P.2d 1057 (Wash.
1959) ; Groh v. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 271 N.W. 374 (1937) ; Shea v. Pettee, 19
Conn. Super. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (1954) ; Fowles v. Ray-O-Vac. Co., 53 Ga. App. 338,
183 S.E. 210 (1935) ; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 15 Misc. 427, 181 N.Y.S.2d 811
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
About half the total number of cases have been actions by parent against child
in most of which the parent has been the mother. Thompson v. Thompson, 264
S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954) ; Rines v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497 (1951); Cafaro
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it is therefore important to determine what the concept of emancipation is, particularly in reference to the question of maintaining
actions between parent and child to recover tort damages.
The term "emancipation" is probably traceable to early Roman
law. But in ancient Roman society the organization of the family was
entirely different from that in later England and America, and in many
respects different from that in later periods of Roman law. A male
person who was civis with no living ancestor in the direct male line
was pater farnilias. His sons and male descendants in direct male line,
his daughters unless married in the most formal way, his daughtersin-law if thus married and their children, regardless of the form of
marriage of their mother, were members of his family sub potestate.
Age had nothing to do with potestas, a person however old could still
6 The ages of majority which was a different
be sub potestate."'
matter
were 14 for males and apparently 12 for females. These ages were
62
important principally for guardianship of one not sub potestate.1
In the Roman law emancipation was a method whereby potestas
was ended earlier than it would have been by the death of the pater
fainilias, and the person emancipated made actually or potentially a
pater familias himself, thus enabling him to have or to establish a
family of his own having potestas over those under him regardless of
their ages. Roman law in its early or strict period made little or
nothing of parental duties (leaving them to self-interest or to developing moral and ethical ideas) but recognized only rights.' 63
v. Cafaro, 118 N.J.L. 123, 184 Atl. 779 (1936); Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App. Div.
651, 248 N.Y.S. 384 (1930) ; Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426
(1948) (9 U. PrT. L. Rnv. 310); Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 49, 94 S.E.2d 12
(1956) ; Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1936).
161. See, BUCKLAND, MANUAL or ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 60-63 (2d ed. 1939)
BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 103-105 (1921); BUCKLAND & McNAIR,
ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW 35-37 (1936).
162. Age for this purpose was later raised to 25. A female, being incapable of
potestas, was always at least theoretically under guardianship or tutelage regardless
of age. BUCKLAND, MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 89 (2d ed. 1939) ; BUCKLAND,
TEXT-BOOK or ROMAN LAW 143 ff. (1921); BUCKLAND & McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND
COMMON LAW 44 ff. 1936).
163. BUCKLAND, TEXT, op. cit. supra note 162 at 132-33; BUCKLAND, MANUAL,
op. cit. supra note 162 at 37, 81 ff.
In early Rome the pater fainilias had unlimited power both as to person and as
to property. This however, was ameliorated in later times, although still leaving wide
powers. "Further . . . [he] could at any moment [emancipate] the child, though the
Praetor remedied this to some extent by giving the child so emancipated a certain
right of succession. . . . To give the son a peculium with power of administration
was normal. The son was capable of civil rights and liabilities and could bring some
actions, though the limits of this power are narrow. Emancipation was usual, and
was often accompanied by a gift of money." BUCKLAND & McNAIR, op cit. supra
note 162 at 35 ff. As to peculium, see Pp. 25, 37.
In the early or strict period of the Roman Law, and also formally at least into
the classical period, emancipation was accomplished by three successive sales into
slavery with respective sales back which ended potcstas of the pater familias, and
after the third sale by some further steps that conferred potestas upon the person
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Anglo-American law has no concept corresponding to the Roman
emancipation,1 64 although it is at times said that emancipation must be
complete such as to end all rights and duties, all filial ties.165 Reaching
the age of majority accomplishes this except for consanguinous or
affinity marriage, incest, and intestate succession, and certain other
statutory duties in the area of support. In some states marriage of a
female (and in a few the marriage of a male as well) below the age
of majority, but above the age of eighteen, makes the person of age;
in some states the age of majority for a girl is eighteen instead of
twenty-one, or at time of marriage if below twenty-one. In a few states
special judicial proceedings may remove the disabilities of infancy."
These are modes of reaching majority and have to do primarily with
legal capacity. Incidentally they also affect parent-child rights and
duties just as does reaching the traditional common-law age of twentyone. The term "emancipation" is sometimes used in the above senses,
but it is more generally applied to certain situations arising before the
age of majority, by whatever mode, is reached, and in this sense is not
1 7
equivalent to general legal capacity. It does not confer capacity.
In Anglo-American law the status of parent-child cannot be
dissolved short of death by unilateral act or even by mutual assent any
more than the dissolution of the husband-wife status can be so accomplished, although the fundamental reasons are different. Adoption,'68
which is entirely statutory, 6 9 does not necessarily have this effect. It is
only by a few more recent statutes that the child is removed for all
emancipated. This method was supplanted in the period of the Empire under
Justinian by court procedure, in a manner similar to adoption. BUCKLAND, TEXT, op.
cit. supra note 162 at 132; BUCKLAND, MANUAL, op. cit. supra note 162 at 81;
BUCKLAND & McNAIR, op. cit. supra note 162 at 37.
164. BUCKLAND & McNAIR, op. cit. supra note 162 at 35.
165. See Holland v. Hartley, 171 N.C. 376, 88 S.E. 567 (1916) ; Round Bros. v.
McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 896 (1909).
166. See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 224. 225 (rev. ed. 1936) ; WILLISTON,
SALES § 10b (rev. ed. 1948) ; See also, McCURDY, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS
788 (4th ed. 1952).
167. Tennessee Mfg. Co., v. James, 91 Tenn. 154, 18 S.W. 262 (1892). Nor has
orphanage, Wickham v. Torley, 136 Ga. 594, 71 S.E. 881 (1911). Cf., Hyman v.
Cain, 48 N.C. Ill. (1855).
168. For adoption in roman law see BUCKLAND & McNAIR, op. cit. supra note 162
at 39-42. See also, BUCKLAND, TEXT, supra note 162 at 121-124; BUCKLAND, MANUAl,
supra note 162 at 74-79. And see Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn. 152, 162, 70 Atl.
453 (1908).
169. Adoption was unknown in the common law. See Woodward's Appeal, 81
Conn. 152, 162, 70 Atl. 453 (1908) ; Chehak v. Battles, 133 Iowa 107, 110 N.W. 330
(1907). An adoption stattite was not enacted in England until 1926 (16 & 17 Geo. V.
c. 29) and has been characterized as "in fact little more than a special form of
guardianship." BUCKLAND & McNAIR, op. cit. supra note 162 at 42. In the United
States adoption statutes of various types date in some states from about 1850. See
further, MCCURDY, op. cit. supra note 166 at 486-500.
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purposes (except marriage and incest) from his natural family and
7
placed in the adoptive family.1 1

If the only legal incidents of the parent-child relation during
minority were parental rights it would seem that these could be
relinquished even by parental unilateral action. But it is self-evident
that if there are parental duties imposed by law these cannot be so
repudiated. It has been said in England 17 ' and in a few states 72 that
a parent has no common-law duty to support even a minor child, his
duty being only moral. In the other states there is held to be such a
common-law duty, not simply one referred to as moral. 13 The parent
satisfies this duty by furnishing adequate support, and one way of
doing this is to permit the child to work for others and to keep his
wages on condition that they be used for the child's support. As long
as the child works and the wages are adequate it may be said that the
parent is under no duty to support; more accurately he is performing
his duty. In Lufkin v. Harvey,1 74 where it was held that a minor child
who worked outside the home for another and earned sufficient for his
support had no power conferred by law to make his parent liable for
necessaries purchased, the court said: "We think a gift to the son of
his wages has about the same bearing upon the liability of the parent
for necessaries that a gift of any other money would have. If it is
sufficient to supply the son with all necessaries, he may not pledge his
parents' credit and the parents are not chargeable therewith. If it is
not sufficient, the parents remain liable for any necessaries which the
wages are not sufficient to supply. This is the substance of the rule of
many cases where recovery has been sustained against a parent for
necessaries furnished to a minor child, notwithstanding such minor
has been given his earnings.'

175

170. See, In re Zaepfel's Estate, 102 Cal. App. 2d 774, 228 P.2d 600 (1951)
(24 So. CAL. L. Rtv. 478) ; MCCURDY, Op. cit. supra note 166 at 486-500.
171. Mortimer v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 482 (Ex. 1840). The minor child has
no power conferred by law (as in the case of husband and wife) to buy necessaries on
the parent's credit. This seems simply to equate duty with a particular method of
enforcement. See Shelton v. Springett, 11 C.B. 452 (1851). In equity a duty was
recognized. Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1, 28 (Ch. 1827). And statutes beginning
in the 16th century recognize or impose such duty.
172. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Hammond v.
Corbett, 50 N.H. 501 (1872). The reference seems to be a denial of the power to
bind the parent for necessaries.
173. And it may be enforced by the same method as in the case of husband and
wife, by exercising a power conferred by law to obtain necessaries where the parent
is in default in the performance of his duty. See Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44
N.W. 295 (1890).
174, 131 Minn. 238, 154 N.W. 1097 (1915).
175. See Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N.W. 295 (1890) where a parent
was held liable for medical services rendered a minor daughter, seventeen years old,
who had been residing and working about thirty miles away from her father's
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The parent-child relation involves a bundle of right-duties, some
being apparently reciprocal, but all being functions of the relation. The
right to custody involves a duty to rear, discipline, and educate (in a
general sense at least) ; but perhaps the matter might be put the other
way around. Thus the parent has a right to the services and earnings
of his minor child, and he has a duty to support. Sometimes the right
is thought to result from the duty to support; sometimes the duty is
thought to result from the right to services. Neither is correct. The
"right-duty" are both functions of the relation although each has
ordinarily dual as well as correlative aspects. The parental right to
services is related to custody, discipline and education (which also is
parental duty). This is its duality. The correlative of this right is the
child's duty to obey, which involves also duality. The duty to support
(also attributable to the duty to rear) is therefore neither a cause nor
an effect of the right to services. They both flow from the objective of
the parent child relation. These right-duties, dual or correlative, may
be separated where it is appropriate for the law to do so.' 76
In Anglo-American common law a usual meaning, narrow but
nevertheless primary, of emancipation, is a relinquishment by a parent
of his right to his minor child's services and earnings either by conduct
forfeiting the right or by assent or agreement with the child or in some
instances by conduct of the child. Since the right to services and earnings depends upon custody this concept of emancipation may operate
within the entire area of custody and control. Thus emancipation may
result from abandonment of the child, by marriage of the child, by the
child's enlistment in the armed forces, or by the parent's voluntary
relinquishment of the right to services and earnings as well as by an
effective transfer of custody. "Relinquishment of the right to services
may be by consent if for any reason the parent feels that it is proper
for the stimulation of initiative or incentive or for the training of the
child in habits of management and industry. .

.

. [and so] a father

may make an enforceable contract with his minor child for employment
house for three years, earning and controlling her own wages, but who became
ill and unable to work.
In Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N.E.2d 344 (1937) (26 ILL. B.J. 211;
32 I.LL. L. REv. 477; 36 MICH. L. REv. 1028; 13 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 279; 71 U.S. L.
REv. 673), it was held that a natural parent's duty to support was not terminated by
the child's adoption, since adoption ended only parental rights. It would seem that
it had been supplanted but might revive if it became necessary. And in Thompson v.
Childers, 231 Ky. 179, 21 S.W.2d 247 (1929) it was held that a contract with a
third person may terminate the parent's duty but he nevertheless remains secondarily

liable, i.e., it would seem, could be called upon if the contract was not performed.
Cf., Betz v. Horr, 250 App. Div. 457, 294 N.Y.S. 546 (1937) (9 FORDHAM L. REv.
462).
176. See note, Reciprocity of Rights and Duties Betwcen Parent and Child, 42
HARv. L. REv. 112 (1928).
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of the child in the parent's home for wages. . . . Relinquishment is
irrevocable as to wages earned thereafter pursuant to it and before
revocation and perhaps to wages to be earned under a contract made
pursuant to it. . . ." However, "It is sometimes said that a parent may
emancipate or relinquish all parental rights and duties and that emancipation may be express or implied, total or partial, temporary or permanent, revocable or irrevocable."' 7 7
It would seem therefore that some of the definitions of emancipation that are to be found include some elements of both the old Roman
law and of the common law and are not entirely accurate as to either.
However that may be, since the controlling reason for not sanctioning
personal injury tort actions between parent and minor child is the
impairment of the parental right-duty to custody, control, rearing and
discipline, the concept of emancipation (whether designated by that
term or not) to be applied should be the one relevant to that particular
dual right-duty. Thus, merely permitting a child to work outside the
home and keep his wages for himself while still living in the home and
a member of the parent's household should not be enough, except
where the parent is the employer and then only within the limits of
that relation. But where for some reason discipline has already lapsed
or has been relinquished to an extent that in fact it is permanently
lost or impaired or the custody of the child is not with the parent at
the time of injury the child should have a right to maintain an action
even though custody may later be resumed by or restored to the parent.
Thus it may be that emancipation in the case of children approaching
majority is more properly to be found than in the case of younger
children. However the cases are in much confusion.
In Crosby v. Crosby,7 ' an action by a mother against a nineteen
year old child for automobile injuries, it was held that a complaint
alleging that the child was permitted to work for a third person, earned
an amount in excess of his living expenses, and was allowed to use
any surplus as he saw fit, sufficiently alleged emancipation. But in
Thompson v. Thompson,179 another case of an action by a mother
against a seventeen year old child, evidence of such facts was held
insufficient to show emancipation, the court saying: "It appears to be
the general rule that before a suit of this sort can be maintained there
177. See McCurdy, Relinquishment by Parent of Right to Minor Child's Services

and Earnings, 15 BOSTON BAR ASS'N BULL, 49 (1944).
178. 230 App. Div. 651, 248 N.Y.S. 384 (1930) (31 COLUM. L. Rpv. 507; 16
CORN LL L.Q. 386). See also, Fowles v. Ray-O-Vac. Co., 53 Ga. App. 338, 183
S.E. 210 (1935).
179. 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954). See also, Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 49,
94 S.E.2d 12 (1956).
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must be emancipation in the primary sense of complete severance of
the filial tie, and an entire surrender of care and custody of the child,
as well as renunciation of parental duties. Emancipation limited to
renunciation of the parent's right to the child's services and earnings is
not sufficient." It was, however, unnecessary to include "severance
of the filial tie" and "renunciation of parental duties," which cannot
legally be accomplished by mere unilateral act or agreement however
much it may be in fact. However, it would seem that the conclusion
reached is correct on the narrower concept when the question is one of
maintaining an action for tort. As was said in Perkins v. Robertson,'8 0
"The fact that a minor is permitted to keep and spend his earnings
for odd jobs done after school or in summer vacation does not establish
his emancipation, . . . and the qualified independence allowed to both
minors in this case seems to be about the same as that granted to the
older 'teenagers' in the average American home today. Certainly there
is nothing in the complaint showing a complete termination of the
parental rights with respect to the control of minors, or indicating that
either child 'did not occupy a subordinate position in the family unit'."''
When additional facts are added that the child, gainfully employed, has left school but lives at home, paying board, the cases are
again in conflict. Some cases have regarded this as sufficient emancipation.182 But in Detwiler v. Detwiler' it was said that the child is
still subject to parental discipline and not emancipated since emancipation requires "total severance of parental tie." Again the conclusion
may be correct, but the statement too broad.
In DeLay v. DeLay8 it was held that a child living with a relative
since the death of the mother and not supported by the father, but who
visited the father from time to time, and was negligently injured
while on a visit had not been emancipated. Again the conclusion may
be correct if during the visits the father had the right to exercise
disciplinary control.
Enlistment in the armed forces has been regarded as emancipation by operation of law at least for the duration of the enlistment.' 5
180. 140 Cal. App. 536, 295 P.2d 972 (1956).
181. Citing Martinez v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 244, 288 P.2d 868 (1955).
182. Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959), reversing 313 S.W.2d 161
(Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Groh v. Krahn, Inc., 223 Wis. 662, 271 N.W. 374 (1937).
But cf., Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1936). See also Fowles
v. Ray-O-Vac. Co., 53 Ga. App. 338, 183 S.E. 210 (1935).
183. 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948) (9 U. PITT. L. R.v. 310).
184. 337 P.2d 1057 (Wash. 1959).
185. Peters v. Industrial Comm., 314 Ill.560, 145 N.E. 629 (1924) (20 ILL.
L. REv. 25); Glover v. Glover, 319 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. App. 1958); Swenson v.
Swenson, 241 Mo. App. 21, 227 S.W.2d 103 (1950).
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Here not only are the parent's right to custody and discipline suspended
and his duty to support as well, but they have been for the time being
supplanted by another relationship under authority of law that is
inconsistent with the parental rights-duties in question. In Wadoz v.
United Nat. Indent. Co., 8 6 where it appeared that a twenty year old

daughter had left home to enter a convent and thereafter had returned,
it was held a question for the jury. In Parks v. Parks,' where a
young child had been so badly injured by negligent operation of an
automobile in which she was a passenger that it was contended that she
would be required to remain in an institution for life, it was held no
emancipation, since emancipation requires release from legal subjection
to the parent. While the reason may be sound, it would be sufficient
to say that she was not an emancipated child at the time of the accident.
For the purpose of deciding whether a child was an emancipated
child when injured so as to be able to maintain a personal injury tort
action against the parent (or vice versa) the question should be whether
at that time the parent had relinquished or been lawfully deprived of
custody or of parental discipline and control, and not simply whether
he had relinquished to some extent his right to the child's services or
earnings. Whether the parent is or is not supporting the child should
be of importance only in its bearing upon the determination of the
above facts. It is not necessary to go further in applying the term

emancipation.
Emancipation focuses attention sharply on the true reason for the
general rule denying personal injury tort actions between parent and
minor child.

Viii.
Although in the matters of wilful injury, 8' of liability of defen-

dant's employer,'"" of insurance against business risk,"' and more
broadly of vocational or business non-parental capacity 1 ' some exceptions have been made by some courts since 1930 to the approach to
personal injury torts between parent and unemancipated minor child
established by the earlier Hewlett,"92 McKelvey,"' and Roller"94 cases,
it is still the general view that such actions cannot be maintained.
186. 274 Wis. 383, 80 N.W.2d 262 (1957).
187. 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957) (19 U. PITT. L. REv. 681; 31 TEmp. L.Q.
233; 3 VILL. L. Rev. 577; 35 U. DET. L. REv. 528).
188. Supra at 531.
189. Supra at 550.
190. Supra at 542.
191. Supra at 542.
192. Stupra note 39.
193. Supra note 40.
194. Supra note 41.
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The reasons given have tended to crystallize into two: protection
of domestic tranquillity, and non-interference with the exercise and
performance of parental rights and duties. The first should be discarded;195 the second has merit if properly confined and applied.
Not all conduct that would be tortious on general principles should
be so regarded if occuring between parent and child. Physical contact
is not necessarily to be viewed in the same way as that between others,
and the conduct of the home may require recognition of a different
quantum of care. Moreover, the parent has functions, rights, and
duties conferred and imposed by law, in the exercise and performance
of which there must be a privileged discretion; only their abuse would
be wrongful. 9
In the matter of "true torts" should this privilege be absolute
or qualified? In the criminal law and in proceedings for the deprivation
of custody for misconduct the privilege is qualified. In tort actions for
personal injury the privilege is by the weight of authority absolute. 9 '
Apart from a difference in the standard or amount of care required,
the conduct of the home has also been regarded as within the scope
of the parental right-duty. Conduct in activities outside the home is
more remote, except as a particular incident involves parental discipline. Within which of these categories should come operation of
the family car?
The impact of the automobile upon the economy, including family
life, and the wide-spread use of liability insurance require a change
in attitude, in this respect at least, toward the question of the interparent-child personal injury tort action. If precluding such action is
to be adhered to in all cases or as a general rule, a specific solution of
automobile injury redress is badly needed. Making exceptions for
wilful injuries and extending the concept of what constitutes a wilful
195. See 2 VILL. L. Rev. 470-471 (1957); 4 VILL. L. Rnv. 336-337 (1959); 43
HARV. L. REv. 1052, 1067, 1074-1076 (1930). It is not always clear what it is that is
thought to disturb domestic harmony: the conduct of the injuring parent (or spouse) ;
the existence of an action; the bringing of the action; or confrontation as adversaries in court. Moreover, there are many inconsistencies in application. Protection
of domestic harmony does not preclude property actions, nor personal injury actions
if the child is an adult or emancipated minor at the time of the injury. In a substantial number of states personal injury tort actions can be maintained between
spouses, and yet in these states cannot be maintained between parent and child although
the type of conduct involved be the same. In many states exceptional categories in
the parent-child situation have developed, and yet in those states the general principle adverse to permitting a personal injury tort action is still adhered to, and
often with safeguarding domestic harmony given as a reason. Finally, tort actions
between minor brothers or sisters are not precluded and may be maintained.
196. See 43 HARV. L. REv. 1077-1078 (1930).
197. Ibid. 1079.
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injury to the operation of an automobile not used for inflicting intentional injury not only may be uneven in application but may be objected

to as a logical fiction. The distinction between parental and business
or vocational capacity is necessarily of limited utility, although it may
be logical. And the application of emancipation is in much confusion.' 98
The solution can be found in providing for insurance coverage, compulsory or consensual, for quasi-liability, which means a provision for
the specific type of risk irrespective of legal liability (but unlike
accident insurance) for situations where the insured would be subject
to legal liability were it not for the parent-child relationship. 9
Possible lack of sufficient parental assets may make an insurance
solution still of importance, but aside from this it would seem that a
fundamental need is to provide by statute for protection of the minor
child, and also of the disabled child, in the event of the parent's death,
by empowering probate judges to make orders, during minority and
without limit of time in the case of the disabled, for such maintenance
as might be necessary and reasonable,2 °° thus controlling the exercise
of the power of disinheritance or the operation of intestacy law.20 1 As
long as the parent is alive it may be expected that he will care for the
needs of the child, and methods of enforcing this duty are provided
by law. If the child were also to be assured necessary and reasonable
protection after his parent's death, assuming parental assets, some of the
pressure for the personal injury tort action would be lacking, and
resort might not be necessary to a litigation (which, however futile in
the past, appellate cases would indicate has nevertheless increased in
20 2
volume) that has been regarded by courts as unseemly.

198. Supra at 556.
199. Supra at 549. Also relevant to spouses where inter-spousal action cannot
be maintained.
200. Supra note 33.
201. Supra note 22.
202. That a minor, or a mentally or physically disabled child can be disinherited, or insufficient provision be made for necessary support, by his parent or by
the operation of the intestacy laws may also be unseemly. See Rice v. Andrews,
127 Misc. 826, 217 N.Y.S. 28 (1926) (25 MIcH. L. Rmv. 555; 2 VA. L. RiG. (ns)
702; 36 YAtS L.J. 424).
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